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Although many neuroimaging studies have investigated adolescent risk taking, few studies have dissociated be-
tween decision-making under risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities). Furthermore,
which brain regions are sensitive to individual differences in task-related and self-reported risk taking remains
elusive. We presented 198 adolescents (11–24 years, an age-range in which individual differences in risk taking
are prominent) with an fMRI paradigm that separated decision-making (choosing to gamble or not) and reward
outcome processing (gains, no gains) under risky and ambiguous conditions, and related this to task-related and
self-reported risk taking. We observed distinct neural mechanisms underlying risky and ambiguous gambling,
with risk more prominently associated with activation in parietal cortex, and ambiguity more prominently with
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), as well as medial PFC during outcome processing. Individual differences in
task-related risk taking were positively associated with ventral striatum activation in the decision phase, spe-
ciﬁcally for risk, and negatively associated with insula and dorsomedial PFC activation, speciﬁcally for ambiguity.
Moreover, dorsolateral PFC activation in the outcome phase seemed a prominent marker for individual differ-
ences in task-related risk taking under ambiguity as well as self-reported daily-life risk taking, in which greater
risk taking was associated with reduced activation in dorsolateral PFC. Together, this study demonstrates the
importance of considering multiple risk-taking measures, and contextual moderators, in understanding the neural
mechanisms underlying adolescent risk taking.Introduction
Adolescence, deﬁned as the developmental phase between childhood
and adulthood, is often described as a period marked by increases in risky
behaviors such as excessive alcohol use and reckless driving, and a strong
need for exploration (Crone and Dahl, 2012; Steinberg, 2008). Theoret-
ical models have explained this rise in risk-taking behavior by
long-lasting development of subcortical and cortical brain regions and
their connections, in which regions involved in affective processing and
reward sensitivity peak in reactivity during adolescence, whereas cortical
brain regions supporting cognitive control undergo a more protracted
development (Casey et al., 2008; Somerville et al., 2011; Crone and Dahl,
2012; Casey 2015). Although a wealth of research has focused on the
neural mechanisms underlying adolescent risk taking, few studies have
systematically investigated the relation with actual risk-taking behavior
either inside or outside the laboratory. These studies report conﬂictingand Educational Psychology, Institute
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c. This is an open access article undeﬁndings, have relatively small sample sizes, or focus on only one or two
brain regions-of-interest (for an excellent review, see Sherman et al.,
2017). Furthermore, although adolescence may be a period of height-
ened risk-taking tendencies on average, not all adolescents are risk takers
(Bjork and Pardini, 2015), and risk-taking tendencies vary substantially
between adolescents. Thus, including predictors of behavior on the in-
dividual level may be key in understanding what drives adolescent risk
taking. In this study we investigated the neural mechanisms underlying
individual differences in adolescent risk taking, using task-related and
self-report measures of risk-taking tendencies in a large adolescent
sample.
A number of brain regions have been associated with individual dif-
ferences in risk-taking tendencies in adolescence (Sherman et al., 2017).
For instance, a greater ventral striatum (VS) response when receiving
monetary rewards has been associated with a greater self-reported drive
to pursuit rewards, fun-seeking tendencies (Braams et al., 2015; Vanof Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK, Leiden, The Netherlands.
ry 2018
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behaviors (Galvan et al., 2007), and increased frequencies of illicit drug
use, binge drinking, and sexual risky behaviors (Bjork and Pardini, 2015;
Braams, Peper, van der Heide, Peters and Crone, 2016). The ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), closely interacting with the VS, has been
additionally related to measures of reward sensitivity in adolescents (van
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015) as well as with greater risk preferences in
adults (Blankenstein et al., 2017; Engelmann and Tamir, 2009).
Conversely, reduced risk-taking tendencies in laboratory choice tasks
have been related to increased anterior insula and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (DMPFC) activation, regions that are typically related to conﬂict
and uncertainty in decision making, and to the integration of cognitive
and affective neural signals (Smith et al., 2014; van Duijvenvoorde et al.,
2015; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). Finally, reduced activation in the
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), a key region involved in self-control
(Dixon, 2015), has been associated with greater laboratory risk taking
in young adults (Gianotti et al., 2009). In contrast, studies with adoles-
cents have shown that longitudinal declines in LPFC activation were
associated with declines in self-reported frequency of real-life risky be-
haviors (such as getting high or drunk at parties; Qu et al., 2015). Taken
together, these studies highlight candidate regions sensitive to individual
differences in risk-taking tendencies, yet none of these studies have
included a substantial adolescent sample size, nor provided a compre-
hensive overview of task-related, and self-reported, measures of risk
taking.
Importantly, the majority of these studies used fMRI paradigms that
present explicit risky (e.g., the Columbia Card Task; van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2015), rather than ambiguous risky, choice contexts. That is, while
explicit risk presents known probabilities (such as in a coin toss, in which
the chance of ‘tails’ is known: 50%), ambiguity presents unknown
probabilities (such as texting while driving: the chance of causing an
accident, for example, is unknown; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
However, the majority of risky situations in daily life presents ambiguous
risk. Indeed, in adolescence, the tendency to gamble under ambiguity,
but not risk, has been associated with individual differences in real-life
risk-taking behavior, such that a higher ‘tolerance’ to ambiguity was
related to higher levels of reckless behavior such as speeding and having
unprotected sex (Blankenstein, Crone, van den Bos and van Duijven-
voorde, 2016; Tymula et al., 2012), and rebellious behavior such as
staying out late (van den Bos and Hertwig, 2017). This may suggest that
behavior under ambiguity is a better reﬂection of adolescent risk taking
in real life (Blankenstein et al., 2016; Tymula et al., 2012; van den Bos
and Hertwig, 2017). Possibly, a tolerance to ambiguity in adolescence is
important for accomplishing important goals prominent in adolescence,
such as exploring new environments, and gathering information about
the world (e.g., Crone and Dahl, 2012; Hartley and Somerville, 2015).
Consequently, distinguishing the mechanisms underlying risk and am-
biguity coding in adolescence is pivotal given that these may have
different relations with observed risk-taking behavior in adolescence. To
date, the neural mechanisms underlying risky versus ambiguous
decision-making have not been investigated in adolescence, nor have
these been related to individual differences in risk-taking tendencies in
adolescence.
Taken together, we aimed to elucidate individual differences in task-
related and self-reported risk-taking behavior in relation to brain acti-
vation in risky and ambiguous decision contexts, in 198 adolescents aged
11–24 years, an age range in which individual differences in daily life
risk-taking are most prominent (Bjork and Pardini, 2015; Willoughby
et al., 2013). We applied the same paradigm as has been previously re-
ported in a different sample of young adults (Blankenstein et al., 2017),
which allows to study choice (choosing to gamble or not) and reward
processing (gains versus no gains) under risk and ambiguity. In line with
this prior study with adults, we expected few overall differences between
risky and ambiguous gambling (Blankenstein et al., 2017, but see Hsu
et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006), although we expected that the DMPFC
would particularly distinguish between risky and ambiguous outcomes664(Blankenstein et al., 2017). Particularly, we expected that individual
differences in risk-taking tendencies would be positively associated with
activation in VS and VMPFC, and negatively with DMPFC, insula, and
LPFC. Given the mixed ﬁndings on the LPFC, this relation could also be
reversed (i.e., enhanced activation with greater risk taking; Qu et al.,
2015; Telzer et al., 2013). Second, given that behavior under ambiguity,
but not risk, has been related to real-life risk-taking tendencies (Blan-
kenstein et al., 2016; Tymula et al., 2012; van den Bos and Hertwig,
2017), we expected these brain-behavior associations to be more pro-
nounced under conditions of ambiguity than risk.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred and sixteen right-handed individuals (110 females, 106
males) between 11 and 24 years old participated in this study. Partici-
pants were part of a longitudinal study (‘Braintime’, which included
three time points each separated by a two-year interval), and were
recruited through schools and local advertisements. The data of the
current study were collected at the third time point, and this was the ﬁrst
time the current task was presented. Eighteen participants were excluded
from analyses because they were either diagnosed with a psychiatric
disorder (n¼ 5), exceeded movement in the MRI scanner with more than
3mm (n¼ 1), loss of data (n ¼ 3), or because of too few trials in which
the gambling option was chosen (i.e., fewer than ﬁve gambles in either
the risky or ambiguous condition, n¼ 9; see ‘Wheel of fortune task’). The
ﬁnal sample therefore included 198 healthy participants (94 female, 104
male,MAge¼ 17.15, SDAge¼ 2.75, range 11.94–24.68 years, see Fig. 1A).
IQ fell in the normal range, as estimated on previous time points of the
longitudinal Braintime study (T1: M¼ 110.08, SD ¼ 9.54; T2:
M¼ 107.84, SD¼ 10.17), using subtests of the WISC-III (participants 8-
to 15-years old) or WAIS-III (participants 16 and older), and did not
correlate with age (see also Braams et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2016).
This study was approved by the institutional review board of the
University Medical Center. Adult participants and parents of underage
participants provided written informed consent, and underage partici-
pants provided written assent. All anatomical scans were cleared by a
radiologist and no abnormalities were reported. Participants were
screened for MRI contra indications and psychiatric or neurological
disorders and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Wheel of fortune task
Participants played a child-friendly wheel of fortune task (see Fig. 1
and Blankenstein et al., 2017). Participants made a series of choices
between pairs of wheels. One wheel represented a safe option (i.e., a
100% chance of winning 3 Euro), whereas the other option represented a
gambling option which could yield more money (i.e., €31, €32, €33, or
€34) but could also yield nothing (€0). The gambling option could either
be risky (probabilities were known) or ambiguous (probabilities were
unknown), and the safe option was a sure gain of €3 on every trial. In the
risky wheels, gain probabilities were presented as the portions of the
wheels in blue, whereas no gain probabilities were presented as the
portions of the wheel in red. Of the risky trials, 30 trials reﬂected a
gamble with a 50% gain probability, 8 trials reﬂected a gamble with a
75% gain probability, and 8 trials reﬂected a gamble with a 25% gain
probability (Fig. 1C). In the ambiguous trials, the wheel was covered with
a grey lid showing a question mark (Fig. 1C). Participants played 46
ambiguous trials and 46 risky trials, which were presented inter-mixed.
After the choice, participants were presented with the reward
outcome (Fig. 1D; gain, no gain). The task was programmed such that the
probabilities presented in the wheels (25%, 50%, and 75%) matched the
actual probabilities of winning when choosing the gambling option. That
is, when presented with a 75% risky trial, there was a 75% chance of
winning when choosing to gamble. Furthermore, the order of gains and
Fig. 1. A. Number of participants across age per gender. B. Example trial of
the wheel of fortune task showing an ambiguous trial with gain as reward
outcome. C. The different gambling wheels. D. Gain and no gain outcomes.
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randomly (without replacement) selected one of the four possible
amounts (€31, €32, €33, or €34) to present on a trial-by-trial basis. The
outcome for gains was presented with the amount in blue over a smiley
face, and the outcome for no gains was presented with €0 in red over a
sad face. Finally, the expected value (i.e., the probability*amount) of the
gambling options was much higher than the safe option (which was
consistently €3). This was done to encourage gambling behavior, so that
participants had a sufﬁcient number of trials for the comparisons of brain
activation of gambling under risk and under ambiguity, their corre-
sponding reward outcomes, and associations with individual differences
in risk-taking tendencies.
The task was presented in the scanner via E-prime (Psychology
Software Tools). Participants were presented with the pairs of wheels
presenting a gamble and safe option. Gamble and safe options were
randomly displayed on the left or right side of the screen on a trial-by-
trial basis. After 1000 msec a grey square appeared in the center of the
screen, prompting the participants to respond. A response had to be
given within a 3000 msec interval. Participants responded with their
right index ﬁnger (to select the wheel on the left) and right middle
ﬁnger (to select the wheel on the right). A grey selection frame around
the chosen wheel conﬁrmed the response, and remained visible for the
duration of the 3000 msec interval. If participants failed to respond
within 3000 msec, the words ‘TOO LATE’ appeared in the center of the
screen for 1250 ms, after which the next trial began. On average, 0.99%
of the trials did not include a response, and these trials were excluded
from all analyses. The choice phase was separated from the outcome665phase by a ﬁxation cross of 2–4 sec (jittered, with increments of 500
msec). The reward outcomes (gain, no gain, or safe gain) were pre-
sented for 1250 msec. The inter-trial-intervals and the optimal trial
sequence were determined with OptSeq (Dale, 1999), with jittered in-
tervals varying between 0 and 9350 ms. In addition, each trial was
preceded by a 500 ms ﬁxation cross, which was not part of the
inter-trial-interval.
Questionnaires
To test for associations between brain activation during decision-
making under risk and ambiguity and indices of real-life risk taking,
192 participants completed the Adolescent Risk-Taking Questionnaire
(ARQ; Gullone et al., 2000). In particular, we focused on the behavior
scale of this questionnaire, which assesses the frequency of engaging in
risky activities in real life with four subscales: Thrill-seeking (Cronbach's
α¼ .205), Rebellious (α¼ .888), Reckless (α¼ .497), and Antisocial
behavior (α¼ .508). Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale how
often they engaged in risky activities (with 1 indicating never and 5
indicating very often). Examples include ‘Snow skiing’ (Thrill-seeking),
‘Staying out late’ (Rebellious), ‘Having unprotected sex’ (Reckless), and
‘Cheating’ (Antisocial).
To test for associations with self-reported reward approach and
avoidant behavior, 182 participants completed the Behavioral Inhibi-
tion System/Behavioral Activation System questionnaire (BIS/BAS;
Carver and White, 1994). The BIS/BAS questionnaire is comprised of
four subscales: BAS Drive (a measure of persistence in the pursuit of
goals, α¼ .750), BAS Fun seeking (a measure of desire for rewards and
the willingness to approach rewards, α¼ .512), BAS Reward Respon-
siveness (a measure of responses to rewards and reward anticipation,
α¼ .659), and BIS (a measure of punishment sensitivity, α¼ .779).
Participants indicated on a 4-point Likert scale the degree to which
statements were applicable to them with (with 1 indicating very true
and 4 indicating very false). Examples include ‘When I want something I
usually go all-out to get it’ (BAS Drive), ‘I'm always willing to try
something new if I think it will be fun’ (BAS Fun seeking), ‘When I get
something I want, I feel excited and energized’ (BAS Reward respon-
siveness), and ‘I worry about making mistakes’ (BIS). Items were
recoded such that higher scores indicates more approach (BAS) or
avoidant (BIS) behavior.
Procedure
Participants received instructions about the MRI session in a quiet
laboratory room, and were accustomed to the MRI environment with a
mock scanner. Next participants received instructions about the wheel
of fortune task, and practiced ten trials on a laptop. We explained the
participants that the ambiguous wheel could reﬂect a gamble of any of
the risky probabilities (i.e., 25%, 50%, 75%). In addition, we
explained that the computer would randomly select the outcomes of
three trials, of which the average amount was paid out in addition to
the standard payout fee. Eventually, the computer selectively drew a
gain, a no gain, and a safe gain outcome (or a gain and two no gain
outcomes if the participant never chose the safe option). This draw
amounted to an additional rounded payout of €11 or €12 for each
participant.
The wheel of fortune task lasted approximately 18min, in two runs of
9min each, win a short break in between. Participants could respond
with their right index and middle ﬁngers using a button box that was
attached to the participant's leg. The task was followed by a high-
deﬁnition structural scan, which lasted approximately 5min.
Participants completed the ARQ and BIS/BAS questionnaire at home,
online via Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com), before the scan date. Adult
participants received €60 and underage participants received €30 for
their participation, in addition to their winnings in the wheel of fortune
task (€11 or €12), and small presents.
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We used a 3T Philips scanner (Philips Achieva TX) with a standard
whole-head coil. Functional scans were acquired during two runs of 246
dynamics each, using T2* echo-planar imaging (EPI). The volumes
covered the whole brain (repetition time (TR) ¼ 2.2 s; echo time
(TE) ¼ 30 ms; sequential acquisition, 38 slices; voxel size
2.75 2.75 2.75 mm; ﬁeld of view (FOV)¼ 220 220 114.68 mm).
The ﬁrst two volumes were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1
saturation effects. A high-resolution 3D T1 scan for anatomical reference
was obtained after the wheel of fortune task (TR ¼ 9.76 msec, TE ¼ 4.59
msec, 140 slices, voxel size ¼ 0.875 mm, FOV ¼ 224  177  168 mm).
MRI data analyses
Preprocessing
We analyzed the data with SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London). Images were corrected for slice timing acquisition
and rigid body motion. Functional volumes were spatially normalized to
T1 templates. Translational movement parameters never exceeded 3mm
(<1 voxel) in any direction for any participant or scan (movement range:
0.31–0.19mm, M¼ 0.065, SD¼ 0.028). The normalization algorithm
used a 12-parameter afﬁne transform with a nonlinear transformation
involving cosine basis function, and resampled the volumes to 3mm3
voxels. Templates were based on MNI305 stereotaxic space. The func-
tional volumes were spatially smoothed using a 6mm full width at half
maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel.
General-linear model
We used the general linear model (GLM) in SPM8 to perform statis-
tical analyses on individual participants’ data. The fMRI time series were
modeled as a series of two events convolved with a canonical hemody-
namic response function (HRF): the choice phase and the outcome phase.
First, the onset of the choice phase was modeled with a duration of
response (1000 msec þ response time; see Fig. 1). Events were modeled
separately for gambling under risk and gambling under ambiguity, and
for choosing the safe option under risk and choosing the safe option
under ambiguity, which resulted in four conditions: Risk Gamble, Am-
biguity Gamble, Risk Safe, and Ambiguity Safe. Second, the onset of the
outcome phase was modeled with zero duration. We modeled the out-
comes (gain, no gain, and safe gain) following a risky or ambiguous
gamble, or safe choice, which resulted in six conditions in the outcome
phase: Risk Gain, Risk No Gain, Ambiguity Gain, Ambiguity No Gain,
Risk Gain Safe, and Ambiguity Gain Safe. In the current study we were
particularly interested in brain activation during gambling, and brain
activation during reward processing following a gamble.
Trials on which participants did not respond were modeled separately
as a covariate of no interest. In addition, we included six motionTable 1
Correlation matrix of the behavioral measures, showing Pearson's r.
1 2 3 4
1 Risky gambling –
2 Ambiguous gambling .686*** –
3 ARQ Thrill-seeking -.050 -.006 –
4 ARQ Rebellious .115 .043 .092 –
5 ARQ Reckless .114 .064 .144* .486**
6 ARQ Antisocial .064 -.019 .206** .479**
7 BAS Drive .079 .094 .090 .206**
8 BAS Fun seeking .069 .132 .171* .383**
9 BAS Reward responsiveness .002 .064 .086 .122
10 BIS .069 -.008 -.135 .048
Note. Risky and ambiguous gambling: n¼ 198, ARQ: n¼ 192, BIS/BAS: n¼ 182, ARQ and BIS/
Correlation is signiﬁcant with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
***Correlation is signiﬁcant at p< .001 (two-tailed, uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
**Correlation is signiﬁcant at p < .01 (two-tailed, uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
*Correlation is signiﬁcant at p < .05 (two-tailed, uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
666parameters as noise regressors. The least-squares parameter estimates of
the height of the best-ﬁtting canonical HRF for each condition separately
were used in pairwise contrasts. These pairwise comparisons resulted in
subject-speciﬁc contrast images, which were used for the second-level
group analyses. We conducted all second-level group and regression
analyses with Family Wise Error (FWE) cluster correction (p< .05, using
a primary voxel-wise threshold of p< .001, uncorrected; Blankenstein
et al., 2017; Woo et al., 2014). We used the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al.,
2002; http://marsbar.sourceforge.net) to visualize patterns of activation
in clusters identiﬁed in the whole-brain regressions. Finally, the co-
ordinates of local maxima are reported in MNI space.
Analyses with individual differences. First, we included a GLM to test for
associations between brain activation and individual differences in
gambling behavior in the wheel of fortune task (i.e., task-related risk-
taking tendencies). A second model was included to test for associations
with ARQ and BIS/BAS scores (i.e., self-reported risk-taking tendencies).
Task-related risky and ambiguous gambling were both included in the ﬁrst
model so that when testing for unique effects of risky gambling, we
controlled for ambiguous gambling (i.e., this was a covariate of no inter-
est), and vice versa. The same approach was used for the ARQ and BIS/BAS
questionnaire, in which we entered all subscales of both questionnaires in
one model. Due to the absence of correlations between task behavior and
self-report measures, including all individual-difference measures in one
GLM did not change any of the reportedﬁndings. Finally, although agewas
not included as a regressor of interest in our primary models, we ran our
models with and without age (linear) as a covariate, and report in the text
which results remain signiﬁcant when controlling for age. In addition, we
exploratively report effects of age in the corresponding tables.
Results
Behavioral results
Table 1 summarizes the correlations between the behavioral mea-
sures (wheel of fortune task, ARQ, and BIS/BAS). In the wheel of fortune
task (n¼ 198), a paired samples t-test showed that participants gambled
a comparable proportion of times under risk and under ambiguity
(t(197)¼.158, p¼ .116, Mrisk¼ .74, SDrisk¼ .21, rangerisk¼ .22–1.00,
Mambig¼ .76, SDambig¼ .25, rangeambig¼ .11–1.00), although there were
individual differences in gambling behavior (see Fig. 2A). A correlation
analysis showed that gambling under risk and ambiguity were correlated
(r ¼ .686, p< .001; Table 1). Furthermore, a paired samples t-test on
reaction times showed that when choosing to gamble, participants
responded signiﬁcantly slower in ambiguous than in risky trials
(t(197)¼5.41, p< .001, Mrisk¼ 585.81, SDrisk¼ 193.51, Mam-
big¼ 645.36, SDambig ¼ 213.63). Finally, given the presence of outcome
feedback in the task, we tested for changes in behavior under risk and5 6 7 8 9 10
*
–
* .275*** –
.185* .197** –
* .240** .259*** .485*** –
.180* .163* .414** .415*** –
-.050 .086 -.008 -.103 .270*** –
BAS: n¼ 179.
Fig. 2. A. Correlation between proportion
gambling under risk and proportion
gambling under ambiguity in the wheel of
fortune task. B. Proportion gambling across
time (task bins) for the ambiguous (black
line) and risky (grey line) conditions. The y-
axis is displayed from 0.5 to 1 to more
clearly illustrate the interaction effect.
Fig. 3. Activation during the contrasts A. Risk
Gamble> Ambiguity Gamble, B. Ambiguity
Gamble> Risk Gamble, C. Gain>No Gain. D. Activation
from the Condition * Outcome interaction effect. The
graph is for illustrative purposes only.
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four task bins of 11 or 12 trials per bin, per condition (risk and ambi-
guity). A within (task bin) * between (risk vs ambiguity) subjects ANOVA
with age as a covariate showed a signiﬁcant interaction effect between
condition and task bin (F(3, 576)¼ 5.84, p< .001, η2¼ .03; Fig. 2B), in
which gambling increased slightly across task bins in the ambiguous (F(3,
579)¼ 18.83, p< .001, η2¼ .09) but not in the risky condition (F(3,
579)¼ 1.11, p¼ .35).
Correlation analyses on the ARQ questionnaire (n ¼ 192) showed that
the subscales were all moderately correlated, with the exception of Thrill-
seeking and Rebellious behavior (Table 1). With respect to the BIS/BAS
questionnaire (n ¼ 182), we observed that BAS Drive, BAS Fun seeking,
and BAS Reward responsiveness were moderately correlated, and that BAS
Reward responsiveness was additionally correlated with BIS. Furthermore,
correlation analyses between the ARQ and BIS/BAS scores (n ¼ 179)
showed that ARQ Rebellious was correlated with BAS Drive and BAS Fun
seeking, and that ARQ Reckless and ARQ Antisocial were both correlated
with all BAS subscales. Finally, task behavior was not related to any of the
self-report measures (Table 1). Age effects on all behavioral measures are
reported in the supplementary materials (Appendix A1).
fMRI results
Whole-brain contrasts
Choice phase. First, we investigated which brain regions showed greater667activation during gambling under risk versus ambiguity. The contrast
Risk Gamble>Ambiguity Gamble revealed greater activation for risk
compared to ambiguity in the bilateral precentral gyrus, right VLPFC, and
posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Fig. 3A, Table 2). The reversed contrast
(Ambiguity Gamble>Risk Gamble) resulted in left DLPFC, bilateral
temporal lobe, inferior parietal cortex (angular gyrus) and precuneus
activation (Fig. 3B, Table 2). When exploratively testing for effects of age,
only activation in the superior parietal lobe increased with age for
gambling under ambiguity compared with risk (see Table A1;
Figure A1A).
Although in the current study we were interested in contrasting risky
and ambiguous gambling, an additional interesting analysis may be to
compare gambling versus choosing safe across risk and ambiguity. We
report the results of this analysis in the supplementary materials (Ap-
pendix A2; Table A2; Figure A2).
Outcome phase. To test which regions coded reward outcomes, we ﬁrst
calculated the contrast Gain>No Gain. This contrast resulted in robust
activation in bilateral striatum, VMPFC, PPC, and angular gyrus (Fig. 3C,
Table 3). When exploring age effects on this contrast, we observed
greater superior parietal and motor cortex activation for younger ages
(Table A3; Figure A3).
To more speciﬁcally examine which regions differentially coded
reward outcomes following a risky versus ambiguous gamble, we ran a
whole-brain condition (risk, ambiguity) * reward outcome (gain, no
gain) ANOVA. This resulted in a signiﬁcant interaction effect in the MPFC
Table 2
MNI coordinates of Local Maxima Activated for the contrasts Risk Gamble>Ambiguity
Gamble, and the reversed contrast. Results were FWE cluster-corrected (p< .05).
Area of activation MNI coordinates T pFWE Volume
x y z
Risk Gamble>Ambiguity Gamble
R middle occipital gyrus,
including bilateral parietal
lobe, bilat. temporal gyrus,
bilat. postcentral gyrus
33 85 16 17.32 <.001 9 196
L calcarine gyrus 0 85 1 15.43
R calcarine gyrus 12 91 4 14.65
R precental gyrus 48 5 31 8.96 <.001 302
R middle frontal gyrus 27 4 52 7.22 <.001 217
R superior frontal gyrus 24 2 70 3.32
R inferior frontal gyrus (pars
triangularis)
51 38 13 6.04 <.001 235
R inferior frontal gyrus (pars
triangularis)
45 41 1 4.21
Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble
R angular gyrus 57 67 34 7.25 <.001 307
L angular gyrus 42 64 31 4.09 <.001 346
R rolandic operculum,
including R superior
temporal gyrus, R
postcentral gyrus, R
posterior insula
54 19 16 5.00 <.001 206
R rolandic operculum 45 19 16 4.85
R superior temporal gyrus 60 10 5 4.00
R precuneus 3 55 34 4.89 <.001 202
L middle cingulate cortex 12 49 37 4.67
L middle temporal gyrus 69 40 2 4.33 .025 81
L middle temporal gyrus 63 28 2 3.84
L middle frontal gyrus,
including L superior frontal
gyrus
30 20 49 4.47 <.001 177
36 11 58 3.90
21 29 52 3.60
Note: L¼ left; R¼ right; bilat¼ bilateral. Anatomical labels are based on the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
Table 3
MNI coordinates of Local Maxima Activated for the contrast Gain>No Gain, irrespective of
risk and ambiguity (FWE voxel-corrected, p< .05 and presented here with k > 10) and the
interaction effect of condition (risk, ambiguity) * reward outcome (Gain, No Gain; FWE
cluster-corrected, p< .05).
Area of activation MNI coordinates T pFWE Volume
x y z
Gain>No Gain, voxel-corrected
R caudate nucleus 12 17 5 15.51 <.001 11 259
L caudate nucleus 9 17 5 13.73
L anterior cingulate cortex,
including bilat. superior
medial gyrus, R mid
orbital gyrus, bilat. middle
frontal gyrus, bilat.
precuneus
6 44 1 10.83
L inferior gyrus, including L
superior temporal gyrus
54 49 11 7.68 <.001 664
L middle temporal gyrus 63 7 17 6.96
L inferior temporal gyrus 60 58 11 6.75
R angular gyrus 42 73 40 7.12 <.001 230
R angular gyrus 39 67 55 5.82
R superior parietal lobe 33 76 52 5.30
R superior temporal gyrus,
including R fusiform gyrus
63 4 1 7.02 <.001 556
R middle temporal gyrus 63 4 23 6.92
R superior temporal gyrus 66 4 8 6.74
R putamen 30 13 7 5.97 <.001 58
L precentral gyrus 48 2 22 5.55 .001 24
Interaction effect Condition * Outcome, cluster-corrected
L superior medial gyrus,
including R superior
medial gyrus, R superior
frontal gyrus, R anterior
cingulate cortex
3 38 31 5.59 <.001 536
R superior frontal gyrus 18 50 40 4.38
R middle frontal gyrus 21 59 28 4.19
R inferior parietal lobule 45 52 46 4.43 .001 115
Note: L¼ left; R¼ right; bilat¼ bilateral. Anatomical labels are based on the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
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we plotted the parameter estimates of this region for risk and ambiguity,
and gain and no gain, separately (Fig. 3D, right panel). From this plot it
can be seen that this interaction is particularly driven by reward out-
comes following an ambiguous gamble. That is, the difference in brain
activation in the MPFC between gain and no gain following an ambig-
uous gamble is larger than this difference following a risky gamble. We
also tested whether the effects observed in the whole-brain ANOVA on
reward outcomes in the MPFC were associated with age, by extracting
the parameter estimates of this ROI for the difference scores and corre-
lating these with age. No signiﬁcant relations were observed (all p's> .1).
Associations with individual-differences measures
Regressions with task behavior: choice phase. Our main interest was to
examine relations between brain activation during risky and ambiguous
decision-making and individual differences in risk-taking tendencies.
First we examined whether individual differences in gambling behavior
in the wheel of fortune task were associated with different activation
patterns during risky and ambiguous gambling, respectively. We
observed a positive effect of risky gambling on the Risk Gamble>Am-
biguity Gamble contrast in the VS (Fig. 4A, Table 4). That is, participants
who gambled more frequently on risky trials (controlling for gambling in
ambiguous trials) showed greater activation in this region during risk
compared with ambiguity (Fig. 4A, right panel).
In the reversed contrast (Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble), we
observed a negative effect of ambiguous gambling (controlled for risky
gambling) in bilateral insula, DMPFC, and dorsal ACC/SMA (Fig. 4B,
Table 4). Speciﬁcally, these analyses show that participants who gambled
less frequently on ambiguous trials in general, showed greater activation668in these regions for Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble when choosing to
gamble (Fig. 4B, right panel).
When we included age as an additional covariate in these analyses,
these effects remained the same.
Regressions with task behavior: outcome phase. Similarly, as for the choice
phase, we investigated effects of gambling in the wheel of fortune task on
the reward outcome phase (Gain>No Gain, collapsed across risky and
ambiguous conditions). A whole-brain regression with risky and
ambiguous gambling behavior as predictors showed a speciﬁc negative
effect of ambiguous gambling in the right DLPFC and right superior
temporal gyrus (extending into the posterior insula; Fig. 5A, Table 5).
These effects remained the same when including age as an additional
covariate.
We used an ROI approach to test whether the DLPFC activation
differed between reward outcome processing following a risky or an
ambiguous gamble. This was not the case: the partial correlations be-
tween ambiguous gambling (controlling for risky gambling) and DLPFC
did not differ signiﬁcantly between reward processing following risk or
ambiguity (Fisher's Z¼ 1.35, p¼ .17; Ambiguity Gain>Ambiguity No
Gain: r ¼ .302, p< .001; Risk Gain> Risk No Gain: r ¼ .183, p¼ .01).
This result indicates that those participants who gambled less frequently
in the ambiguous trials showed greater activation in this region when
processing rewards, but this was not driven by processing rewards after
risk or ambiguity (Fig. 5A, right panel).
Regressions with self-reported risk-taking behavior: choice phase. To test
which regions were associated with self-reported risk-taking measures,
we included ARQ and BIS/BAS subscales in a whole-brain regression. No
Fig. 4. A. The positive effect of risky gambling on Risk Gamble>Ambiguity
Gamble in the ventral striatum. A higher frequency of gambling under risk
was associated with increased ventral striatum activation during Risk
Gamble>Ambiguity Gamble. B. The negative effect of ambiguous gambling
on Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble. Increased gambling behavior under
ambiguity was associated with an attenuated DMPFC and bilateral insula
response. The graphs are for illustrative purposes only. P.E.¼ param-
eter estimate.
Table 4
MNI coordinates of Local Maxima Activated for the results of regressions with gambling
behavior on Risk Gamble>Ambiguity Gamble and the reversed contrast. Results were
FWE cluster-corrected (p< .05).
Area of activation MNI coordinates T pFWE Volume
x y z
Positive effect of risky gambling on Risk Gamble>Ambiguity Gamble
L caudate nucleus 15 2 25 4.86 <.001 170
R caudate nucleus 6 14 5 4.15 .008 105
Negative effect of ambiguous gambling on Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble
L anterior cingulate cortex 9 35 19 6.44 <.001 429
R anterior cingulate cortex 6 38 25 5.38
L superior medial gyrus 9 32 31 5.06
L supplementary motor area,
including R supplementary
motor area, bilat. superior
medial gyrus, bilat. superior
frontal gyrus, R middle
cingulate cortex
9 11 52 5.13 <.001 392
3 26 52 5.11
0 17 64 4.56
L insula lobe 27 26 4 4.88 .005 116
L insula lobe 30 11 14 4.49
L insula lobe 30 20 11 4.32
L inferior frontal gyrus (pars
orbitalis)
36 26 5 3.53
R insula lobe 33 29 2 4.62 .005 117
R inferior frontal gyrus (pars
orbitalis)
39 20 20 3.93
R inferior frontal gyrus (pars
orbitalis)
42 29 17 3.46
Note: L¼ left; R¼ right; bilat¼ bilateral. Anatomical labels are based on the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
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(Risk Gamble>Ambiguity Gamble or vice versa). The only clusters that
survived thresholding was a positive relation with BAS Drive and BAS
Fun seeking in parietal and motor brain regions during Ambiguity
Gamble> Risk Gamble (summarized in Table 6). When including age as
an additional covariate, only the effect of BAS Drive survived cluster
correction.
Regressions with self-reported risk-taking behavior: outcome phase. A similar
regression was performed testing for effects of ARQ and BIS/BAS sub-
scales on the general contrast Gain>No Gain. First, we observed a
negative effect of ARQ Rebellious behavior in the bilateral DLPFC
(Fig. 5B; Table 7). Speciﬁcally, this indicates that those participants who
show more rebellious behavior in daily life, showed signiﬁcantly less
activation in the DLPFC when processing reward outcomes. Similar, but
less pronounced, results were observed when including age as a
covariate.
We tested whether this activation pattern was driven by outcome
processing in the risky or ambiguous condition. When comparing the
partial correlations between Rebellious behavior (controlling for the
other ARQ and BIS/BAS subscales) and DLPFC activation in the risky,
with the ambiguous condition, we observed no signiﬁcant differences
between these conditions (left DLPFC: Fisher's Z¼ .72, p¼ .47, right
DLPFC: Z¼ .06, p¼ .95; ambiguity: left DLPFC r ¼ .307, p< .001, right669DLPFC: r ¼ .258, p¼ .001, risk: left DLPFC: r¼.239, p¼ .002, right
DLPFC: r ¼ .252, p¼ .001; Fig. 5B, right panel). This shows that the
negative association between rebellious behavior and reward outcome
processing did not depend on whether the reward was preceded by a
risky or ambiguous gamble.
With respect to BAS Drive, a greater tendency to work for rewards
was also associated with an attenuated left DLPFC response when pro-
cessing rewards (Fig. 5C, Table 7). These effects remained the same when
including age as an additional covariate.
Again we tested whether this activation pattern was driven by
outcome processing in the risky or ambiguous condition. Similar to the
association with Rebellious behavior, we observed that the association
with BAS Drive did not differ (Z¼.104 p ¼ .92) between rewards
following a risky (r ¼ .243, p¼ .001) and ambiguous gamble (r ¼
.233, p¼ .002, Fig. 5C, right panel).
Discussion
This study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying individual
differences in risk-taking tendencies during risky and ambiguous
decision-making in a large adolescent sample with a wide age range
(11–24 years). We speciﬁcally focused on two indices of risk taking: task-
related (gambling under risk and ambiguity) and self-reported indices of
risk taking (the frequency of engaging in real-life risky behaviors and
trait reward sensitivity). The analyses resulted in a number of main
ﬁndings. First, we discovered that risky versus ambiguous gambling are
reﬂected in different patterns of brain activation. Second, individual
differences in task-related risk-taking recruited different regions
depending on whether the context was risky or ambiguous. Finally, in-
dividual differences in self-reported risk-taking were primarily reﬂected
in activation during reward outcome processing. The discussion is
organized alongside these main ﬁndings.Neural mechanisms underlying risky and ambiguous decision-making
First, we investigated the neural correlates of gambling and reward
Fig. 5. A. The negative effect of gambling under ambiguity on Gain>No
Gain. B. The negative effect of ARQ Rebellious behavior on Gain>No Gain. C.
The negative effect of BAS Drive on Gain>No Gain. Activation was similar for
both conditions (see graphs, right panels). P.E.¼ parameter estimate.
Table 5
MNI coordinates of Local Maxima Activated for the negative effect of ambiguous gambling
on Gain>No Gain. Results were FWE cluster-corrected (p< .05).
Area of activation MNI coordinates T pFWE Volume
x y z
L superior temporal gyrus, L
posterior insula
54 19 13 4.74 <.001 531
L postcentral gyrus 54 13 40 4.44
R superior frontal gyrus 24 20 58 5.67 .007 102
R middle frontal gyrus 45 26 37 3.82
R middle frontal gyrus 42 35 43 3.65
R precentral gyrus, including R
supplementary motor area, R
postcentral gyrus
39 19 58 4.73 <.001 505
R paracentral lobule 3 31 58 4.33
R posterior insula lobe,
including R superior
temporal gyrus, R precentral
gyrus, R postcentral gyrus, R
inferior frontal gyrus (pars
opercularis).
36 7 13 4.26 <.001 244
R rolandic operculum 45 7 19 4.25
R rolandic operculum 48 16 13 4.17
Note: L¼ left; R¼ right; bilat¼ bilateral. Anatomical labels are based on the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
Table 6
MNI coordinates of Local Maxima Activated for the results of regressions with ARQ and
BIS/BAS subscales on Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble. Results were FWE cluster-
corrected (p< .05).
Area of activation MNI coordinates T pFWE Volume
x y z
Positive effect of BAS Drive on Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble
R inferior parietal lobe 54 52 46 4.18 .02 70
Positive effect of BAS Fun seeking on Ambiguity Gamble> Risk Gamble
R supramarginal gyrus, including
R postcentral gyrus
63 28 49 3.87 .048 56
R supramarginal gyrus 51 31 40 3.58
R supramarginal gyrus 54 34 49 3.51
Note: L¼ left; R¼ right; bilat¼ bilateral. Anatomical labels are based on the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
Table 7
MNI coordinates of Local Maxima Activated for the results of the regression with ARQ and
BIS/BAS subscales on Gain>No Gain. Results were FWE cluster-corrected (p< .05).
Area of activation MNI coordinates T pFWE Volume
x y z
Negative effect of ARQ Rebellious on Gain>No Gain
R middle frontal gyrus 39 14 52 5.02 .006 112
R middle frontal gyrus 39 26 37 3.93
L precental gyrus 36 2 61 4.41 .001 148
L middle frontal gyrus 36 5 52 4.25
L middle frontal gyrus 27 14 43 3.89
R paracentral lobule 6 34 73 4.06 .025 80
R precuneus 6 46 67 3.82
R precentral gyrus 15 22 64 3.56
Negative effect of BAS Drive on Gain>No Gain
L inferior parietal lobule 57 52 40 4.45 .006 110
L angular gyrus 42 55 25 3.62
L supramarginal gyrus 60 52 28 3.56
L middle frontal gyrus 42 23 49 4.43 .022 83
L middle frontal gyrus 39 11 49 3.47
L middle frontal gyrus 33 20 43 3.46
Note: L¼ left; R¼ right; bilat¼ bilateral. Anatomical labels are based on the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
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670processing under risk and ambiguity, using a previously validated fMRI
gambling paradigm (Blankenstein et al., 2017). Previous neuroimaging
studies in adults have questioned whether risk and ambiguity are re-
ﬂected by the same underlying neural mechanisms, given that risk and
ambiguity preferences may separately inﬂuence risk-taking behavior
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Although some have predominantly
observed overlap in the neural correlates underlying valuation under risk
and ambiguity (Blankenstein et al., 2017; Levy et al., 2010), others have
observed distinct neural patterns between these decision contexts (Hsu
et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006), which may particularly arise when
including individuals’ preferences for risk and ambiguity (Blankenstein
et al., 2017). When contrasting risky and ambiguous gambling, we
observed that risk resulted in greater neural activation in the right ventral
LPFC, bilateral precentral gyrus, and parietal cortex, whereas ambiguity
resulted in greater activation in left dorsal LPFC and temporal lobe.
Activation in the former set of regions may possibly serve the executive
processing of explicit probabilities presented during risky trials as found
in prior studies with adults (Blankenstein et al., 2017; Huettel et al.,
2005; Huettel et al., 2006), but do not concur with adult ﬁndings of risk
preferences in the striatum or OFC (Blankenstein et al., 2017; Engelmann
and Tamir, 2009; Hsu et al., 2005). The regions that were particularly
activated during gambling under ambiguity ﬁt well with earlier ﬁndings
of ambiguity coding in the LPFC in adults (Huettel et al., 2006).
We further addressed the question whether outcomes were processed
differently after gambling in a risky or ambiguous context. Although VS
andMPFCwere generally activated in response to rewards irrespective of
N.E. Blankenstein et al. NeuroImage 172 (2018) 663–673a risky or ambiguous decision context, a more dorsal region of the MPFC
was particularly activated during rewards following ambiguous,
compared with risky, gambles. A similar pattern has been observed in
prior work with adults (although slightly more dorsal; Blankenstein et al.,
2017), and was interpreted as a general signal of uncertainty coding,
being particularly present in ambiguous decision contexts (based on a
search in NeuroSynth, an online meta-analysis database; Yarkoni et al.,
2011). Alternatively, the MPFC has been implicated in performance
monitoring and feedback integration following risky decisions (McCor-
mick and Telzer, 2017a; van Noordt and Segalowitz, 2012; Xue et al.,
2009), which would concur with a learning signal over time that is
greater in ambiguous compared to risky contexts. Although behavior did
not change profoundly in both decision contexts, gambling increased
slightly over time for ambiguous trials. Future studies may therefore
further investigate the role of the MPFC in learning (e.g., behavioral
adjustment) versus resolving outcome uncertainty under risky and
ambiguous conditions, for instance by using a paradigm in which out-
comes inﬂuence subsequent decisions in a learning context, and using
varying levels of ambiguity.
Relations with task-related and self-reported risk-taking
Our main interest was to relate individual differences in risk-taking
tendencies to brain activation during risky and ambiguous decision-
making during adolescence, given that this is a time marked by a rise
in risk-taking tendencies (Steinberg, 2008). To this end we included
participants from a wide age range, in which individual differences in
risk-taking tendencies are most prominent (Bjork and Pardini, 2015;
Willoughby et al., 2013). Although participants were encouraged to
gamble by presenting gambling options higher in expected value than the
safe option, there was substantial variability in risky and ambiguous
gambling behavior, allowing the investigation of these individual-
difference measures in relation to brain activation.
First, during the choice phase, a higher frequency of gambling under
risk (but not ambiguity) was associated with increased activation in the
VS in the risky condition only, whereas a greater tendency to gamble
under ambiguity (but not risk) was related to reduced DMPFC and insula
activation in the ambiguous condition only. Generally, we replicated
prior research showing that enhanced risk-taking is associated with
greater striatum activation (Galvan et al., 2007), and reduced DMPFC
and insula activation (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015; Van Leijenhorst
et al., 2010). However, we now show that these neural correlates differed
across task conditions. Speculatively, these ﬁndings may relate to the
difference in subjective evaluation of the decisions at hand, in which the
tendency to engage in risky gambles may be triggered by a greater
reward valuation, whereas the tendency to engage in ambiguous gambles
is mainly driven by an aversion to uncertainty. Previous research has
related insula and DMPFC activation in the context of risky
decision-making as an affective and cognitive component (respectively)
of uncertainty processing (Mohr et al., 2010; van Duijvenvoorde et al.,
2015). That is, activation in the insula may reﬂect the increased expe-
rienced negative affect when encountering uncertainty (van Duijven-
voorde et al., 2015), which may be more pronounced under ambiguity
than risk. Simultaneously, activation in the DMPFC may function as a
cognitive warning signal to prevent risky behavior and has been related
to participants’ subjective experience of uncertainty (Xue et al., 2009).
This interpretation ﬁts well with the ﬁnding that insula activation was
heightened for those individuals who gambled less frequently in this
condition.
A new direction in this study is that we related individual differences
in risk-taking tendencies not only to choice, but also to outcome pro-
cessing. We observed that a greater tendency to gamble under ambiguity
was associated with decreased right DLPFC activation during reward
processing. In addition, greater self-reported rebellious behavior, and a
greater drive for rewards, were also associated with a reduced DLPFC
response when processing rewards. This contradicts prior research on671adolescent individual differences in real-life risk taking and brain acti-
vation, which showed the opposite relation (a greater DLPFC response
with increased risk taking; Qu et al., 2015), but is in line with prior
research in young adults (Gianotti et al., 2009) and with studies that
relate lower impulsivity to strengthened connectivity between the
striatum and DLPFC (Achterberg et al., 2016; Dixon, 2015; van den Bos
et al., 2014). These ﬁndings point towards an important role for the LPFC
in individuals’ risk preferences, and concurs with the idea that lower
self-control in response to rewards may lead adolescents to engage in
greater risk taking. However, it should be noted that in the current task,
risk taking could be seen as advantageous (i.e., the gamble presented a
higher expected value), thus leading to more monetary gains. Similarly, it
may be adaptive to display certain levels of reward motivation or
rebellious behavior, particularly in this age range (Romer et al., 2017).
The adaptive nature of risk taking should be further examined, consid-
ering adolescence as a period of opportunities, and not only of risk (Crone
et al., 2016).
Limitations and future directions
A number of limitations need to be considered. First, although the
current study included a wide age range across adolescence (11–24 years,
an age range in which individual differences in daily life risk-taking are
prominent; Bjork and Pardini, 2015; Willoughby et al., 2013), the ma-
jority of our ﬁndings were independent of age, except for the results on
self-report measures. That is, ARQ and BAS subscales increased with age
and/or peaked in adolescence, which is consistent with prior reports on
these measures which is consistent with prior reports on these measures
(Blankenstein et al., 2016; Urosevic et al., 2012) and with previous re-
ports of this sample (regarding the BAS scales, Braams et al., 2015;
Schreuders et al., in press). While in the current study we focused
particularly on individual differences in an adolescent sample, it is sur-
prising that we did not ﬁnd effects of age on our neural results. Prior
studies reported heightened activation in dorsal ACC in early adolescence
(Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010) and in DMPFC, anterior insula, and sub-
callosal cortex in mid-adolescence with increasing risk processing (van
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010) and adolescent
peaks in striatum activity (Braams et al., 2015; Van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010; Silverman et al., 2015). Others reported a monotonic increase from
childhood to adulthood in MPFC during reward processing (van Duij-
venvoorde et al., 2015). Importantly, these studies included participants
from late childhood/early adolescence (8–10 years), whereas our youn-
gest participants were 11–12 years old. Indeed, in a recent review it was
argued that information from childhood is needed to fully understand
developmental patterns and underlying factors of risk-taking across
adolescence (Li, 2017). Furthermore, developmental effects are often not
observed when the risky option is obviously advantageous (Defoe et al.,
2015; Li, 2017), as in the current study. An opportunity for future
research may therefore be to determine age effects in risk and ambiguity
sensitivity, a question that may be tackled with paradigms including a
non-safe alternative (e.g., Defoe et al., 2015) as well as includingmultiple
levels of risk and ambiguity (Blankenstein et al., 2016) in a broad age
range starting in late childhood and extending into adulthood.
Second, behavior on the task was not correlated to any of our mea-
sures on real-life risk taking. Studies using both task-related and self-
report measures of risk taking often did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant correla-
tions, which have been suggested to be caused by underpowered studies
(for a review, see Sherman et al., 2017). However, the current study, and
others (e.g., Mamerow et al., 2016) with relatively large sample sizes also
did not ﬁnd associations between task-related and self-reported risk
taking. Recently, a large comprehensive study with adults used a psy-
chometric approach to examine the multidimensionality of risk-taking
(Frey et al., 2017). This study showed that risk propensity measures
(i.e., self-report measures on for instance sensation seeking and impul-
sivity) and risk frequency measures (i.e., real-life risk behaviors such as
smoking) were only weakly correlated with behavioral measures (i.e.,
N.E. Blankenstein et al. NeuroImage 172 (2018) 663–673revealed preferences: task-based risk measures such as behavior on the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task and the Columbia Card Task). That is, the
authors discovered that a general factor of risk preference emerged from
the propensity measures and frequency measures, which did not share
variance with behavioral measures (revealed preferences). Possibly, in
the current study, task-related risk taking (a behavioral measure) and
self-reported risk taking as measured with the BIS/BAS subscales (a
propensity measure), and the ARQ subscales (a frequency measure) also
reﬂect different behavioral manifestations of risk behavior in our
adolescent sample. Although the psychometric properties of risk prefer-
ences in adolescence warrants further study, this echoes the need for and
potential of including multidimensional measures of risk-taking (i.e.,
behavior, propensity, and real-life frequencies) in adolescence.
Third, task behavior was heavily tuned towards gambling, by pre-
senting participants with gambles much higher in expected value than
the safe option. To derive a more sensitive measure of individuals’
preferences for risk and ambiguity, future research may beneﬁt from
including an additional task that presents multiple levels of risk and
ambiguity (Blankenstein et al., 2017; Engelmann and Tamir, 2009).
Fourth, participants’ gambling frequency determined the number of
gain and no gain trials included in the analyses. That is, those participants
who gambled more frequently experienced more reward outcomes than
those participants who chose the safe option more frequently, which may
have biased our results in the reward outcome phase. However, a loss of
power due to fewer trials is unlikely to drive our main results, given that
less gambling actually led to greater activation during choice and
outcome.
Finally, indices of real-life risk taking were based on retrospective,
self-report questionnaires. An opportunity for future research is to more
explicitly measure day-to-day risk taking, for instance by using ecological
momentary assessments, in which participants are asked to answer
questions multiple times each day for an extended period of time, making
it possible to collect rich, real-time data on individuals’ risk-taking
behavior (Shiffman et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2004).
Conclusion
This study is the ﬁrst to examine individual differences in risk-taking
tendencies in adolescence in relation to the neural mechanisms under-
lying decision-making under risk and ambiguity. Using a previously
established fMRI gambling paradigm, we were able to study gambling
and reward processing under risk and ambiguity in a large adolescent
sample spanning a wide age range (11–24 years). We demonstrate that
risky and ambiguous gambling is reﬂected in different patterns of brain
activation, and that the MPFC appears key in processing reward out-
comes following ambiguity. In addition, individual differences in task-
related and self-reported risk-taking tendencies were associated with
activation in the VS, LPFC, insula and DMPFC, regions previously asso-
ciated, respectively, with reward processing, cognitive control, and
cognitive-affective integration. Moreover, we found that the neural
mechanisms underlying task-related risk taking were differentially
recruited depending on whether the choice context was risky or ambig-
uous. Finally, reward valuation in the LPFC seems key for individual
differences in risk-taking tendencies in this adolescent sample. Together,
this study demonstrates the importance of considering multiple measures
of risk-taking tendencies, and contextual moderators, in unraveling the
neural mechanisms underlying risk taking in adolescents.
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